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The First Amendment and Modern
Technology: The Free Speech Clause and
Chatbot Speech
by HILDA KAJBAF*
Introduction
In 1787, when the United States Constitution’s Free Speech Clause
gained legal recognition, humans were at the producing and receiving ends
of conversations, and the only intermediary, if any, was the messenger who
carried the common handwritten letter or orally recited the communication.
Other than the human-engineered instant message and email technology
found in digital devices, an artificial1 party involved in the communication
process was uncommon. Today, modern digital technology within our
digital devices resembles the human messenger, as the devices merely relay
one human’s message to another. This exemplifies that the conversational
universe has expanded since its inception. In 2019, humans often initiate a
conversation not directly with a personal greeting to a significant other,
family member, or friend, but rather to their chatbot of choice, be it Siri,
Google, or Alexa;2 these chatbots use programmed algorithms to respond
with words, and a conversation thus takes place.3 Indeed, businesses use
chatbots as well, as “53% of service organizations expect to use chatbots
*JD Candidate 2020, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. BA in Political
Science and America Studies at California State University, Fullerton, 2017.
1. This Note uses “artificial” to mean “nonhuman.”
2. Micah Singleton, Nearly a quarter of US households own a smart speaker, according to
Nielson, THE VERGE (Sept. 30, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/
2018/9/30/17914022/smart-speaker-40-percent-us-households-nielsen-amazon-echo-google-hom
e-apple-homepod (24% of U.S. households own a smart device like Amazon’s Echo, Google Home,
or Apple’s Siri, and 68% of owners use them simply to chat with them for fun); see also Grant
Clauser, What Is Alexa? What Is the Amazon Echo, and Should You Get One?, WIRECUTTER (Nov.
21, 2018), https://thewirecutter.com/reviews/what-is-alexa-what-is-the-amazon-echo-and-shouldyou-get-one/; Grant Clauser & Brent Butterworth, Is the Google Home the Voice-Controlled
Speaker for You?, WIRECUTTER (May 10, 2019), https://thewirecutter.com/revie ws/google-homevoice-controlled-speaker/.
3. Gina Neff & Peter Nagy, Talking to Bots: Symbiotic Agency and the Case of Tay, 10
INT’L J. OF COMM. 4915 (2016).
[337]
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within 18 months—a 136% growth rate that foreshadows a big role for the
technology in the near future.”4 Our contemporary conversations with
chatbots raise a constitutional question not previously considered: is the
speech produced by chatbots constitutionally protected? If so, whose speech
is the Constitution protecting—that of the chatbot or the human who
programmed it with algorithms? If the Supreme Court recognizes the human
programmer as the speaker of chatbot speech, as this Note contends it should,
what are the potential liabilities the programmer could face as a result of such
recognition, and how would this change the doctrinal landscape of the First
Amendment for government regulation of speech?
The Judicial Branch’s interpretation of constitutional text hinges on the
debate between originalist and non-originalist theories of constitutional
interpretation. Accordingly, a preliminary question is: how did the Framers
intend the Free Speech Clause to function in 2019? Although the Framers
likely did not imagine the invention of chatbots as conversational
counterparts, chatbot speech could nevertheless be constitutionally protected
and chatbot programmers recognized as speakers vis-à-vis their creations.
While scholars suggest various approaches to constitutional interpretation,
two views dominate: the originalist and the non-originalist theories. This
Note posits that the non-originalist view supports the constitutional
protection of chatbot speech.5 Non-originalists believe the Framers drafted
a constitution intended to constantly evolve and adapt to the realities of
society as it continues to progress.6
If judges agreed on how the Free Speech Clause should operate, the
legal community would have a definitive answer to, or at minimum a
stronger foundation for, understanding the interaction between the Free
Speech Clause and chatbot speech. However, reality reflects no such
agreement. Scholars continue to disagree on how to best interpret and apply
the Free Speech Clause to chatbot speech7, and the Supreme Court has never
considered whether the Free Speech Clause protects chatbot speech and
whether the chatbot itself, or its programmer deserves these rights.
Moreover, legal scholarship on chatbot speech is scarce, and continues to
evolve alongside technology.8 Existing literature on this topic only
addresses whether chatbot speech could be constitutionally protected and
does not address who the protected speaker would be if such speech is
4. Mathew Sweezey, Key Chatbot Statistics to Know in 2019, SALESFORCE BLOG, (Aug. 4,
2019), https://www.salesforce.com/blog/2019/08/chatbot-statistics.html.
5. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (ASPEN
STUDENT TREATISE) 18 (Wolters Kluwer, 5th ed. 2015).
6. Id.
7. See generally, RONALD K. L. COLLINS & DAVID SKOVER, ROBOTICA 37 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2018).
8. Id.
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recognized. Importantly, even the former analysis has been limited to the
context of chatbots with technology not yet existent, that is, current
scholarship fascinates about the intersection of future chatbots and the First
Amendment.10 This Note helps close the existing doctrinal gap in two ways:
first, this Note explains that the Free Speech Clause could apply to existing
chatbot speech but should not for policy reasons; second, this Note explains
that if the Supreme Court extends constitutional protection to chatbot speech,
the Court should identify the chatbot programmer as the speaker.
Throughout these analyses, this Note will apply theories that underlie
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the Free Speech Clause to the concept of
chatbot speech. This Note will demonstrate that the Free Speech Rights exist
on a continuum, and thus recognition of chatbot speech would not be a
revolutionary concept, but an evolutionary one.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Section I defines “chatbot” and
discusses its evolving capabilities and limitations, from ELIZA in 1966 to
Microsoft’s Tay in 2018.11 Section II delves into three theories that the
Supreme Court has used to interpret freedom of speech issues, specifically,
the marketplace of ideas, the reader-response criticism, and the chilling
effect. This section provides a philosophical perspective on the Free Speech
Clause to identify overlapping themes present in traditional speech and
chatbot speech. Section III analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s
Opinion in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, and the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s opinion in Jian
Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc. to present a standard under which federal courts
could recognize chatbot speech as constitutionally protected speech.12
Section IV considers the Supreme Court’s controversial opinion in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission to illustrate the Court’s willingness
to afford Free Speech Rights to non-humans, and to demonstrate that existing
precedent could be adapted to include chatbot speech.13 Lastly, section V

9. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 37; see also Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton &
Margot E. Kaminski, Siri-ously 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First
Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481, 2482 (2017) (explaining that taking “the logic of First
Amendment jurisprudence and theory to its natural conclusion, [Microsoft’s] Tay’s strong AI
progeny could have First Amendment rights”);
10. Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2481; see also COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 37.
Additionally, the chatbots discussed in this Note all depend on humans, that is, without a human
initiating conversation, the chatbot will not speak. Conversely, the literature referenced to discusses
the potential First Amendment implications for chatbots that can speak on their own initiative—
more advance chatbots that do not currently exist.
11. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4915-27.
12. Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011); Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F.
Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
13. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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explains the constitutional implications and outlines the potential dangers of
extending free speech protection for society.
First Amendment jurisprudence continuously evolves with
technological advancements. For example, the Free Speech Clause has
evolved to encompass speech produced through radio, television, and video
games.14 This Note will highlight the constitutional theories and judicial
precedent that permit the Supreme Court to adapt the Free Speech Clause
once again; this time to recognize chatbot speech, and to further tailor the
scope of the Constitution to encompass the technology-dependent realities
of the twenty-first century. However, this Note further underscores the
negative implications of making such adaption, and therefore ultimately
concludes, for policy reasons, that chatbot speech should constitute speech
protected under the First Amendment.

I.

The Historical Context, Capabilities, and Evolution of
Artificially Intelligent Chatbots

In 1966, artificial intelligence transcended science fiction, and entered
reality through computer screens.15 Chatbots like Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s
Siri, and Google’s Home, are technological programs with artificial
intelligence that engage users in conversation through textual or auditory
features.16 This textual or auditory conversation between chatbots and
human users simulates the experience of an intelligent human-to-human
conversation.17 Artificial intelligence is created using algorithms that make
a chatbot capable of processing a human’s message, and subsequently
providing an appropriate response to the human’s question or comment.18
Some chatbots, such as Microsoft’s Tay,19 contain complex learning
algorithms, which allow them to process and build on the human user’s
speech to mimic the model of learning and human conversation.20
The use of the word learning, however, causes confusion in
understanding a chatbot’s capabilities. Unlike a human, where the capability
to learn, and thus become smarter, is arguably limitless, a chatbot’s capacity
to learn is limited by the specific algorithms with which it was programmed.
A chatbot will respond to a user’s message by selecting the appropriate
14. Brown, 564 U.S. 786.
15. ELIZA, https://www.masswerk.at/elizabot/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018).
16. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4915.
17. Id. at 4916.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Asha Barbaschow, Microsoft and the learnings from its failed Tay artificial
intelligence bot, ZD NET (July 24, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-and-thelearnings-from-its-failed-tay-artificial-intelligence-bot/ (explaining that Tay was a chatbot that was
launched on Twitter to interact with humans).
20. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4928.
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expression from “preprogrammed schemas,” or adaptive machine learning
algorithms.21 Because algorithms limit a chatbot’s capacity to respond,
chatbots not only lack agency in a conversation,22 but also encounter
problems when a human user asks a question to which it was not
programmed to respond.23 Thus, a current chatbot’s responses are fully
dependent on a programmer’s algorithms.24 This major limitation supports
a Supreme Court ruling that recognizes a chatbot’s human programmer as
the speaker of chatbot speech, for it is the programmer who predetermines
the speech that will transpire and maintains ultimate control of the
conversation. Consider the alternative: if the Supreme Court recognized the
chatbot device as a speaker, then, arguably, the human programmer (if a
government actor) who encodes the chatbot with algorithms, which dictate
the chatbot’s responses, could be in violation of the First Amendment for
compelling speech. Moreover, if a chatbot was the protected speaker, how
would a chatbot, with speech limited to the algorithms with which it was
programmed, articulate that it faced an injury and bring a legal claim in
court?25 Accordingly, if chatbot speech were to be protected speech, the
current constraints surrounding it would compel the Supreme Court to
identify programmers as the protected speaker of chatbot speech.
In order to better understand the function of a chatbot, this Note presents
two examples of chatbots: the first chatbot, ELIZA, and a 2016 chatbot, Tay,
created by Microsoft. This Note will then shift to a consideration of United
States Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence to explore the ways
in which chatbots could fit within the sphere of constitutional protection.
A. ELIZA and Tay

In 1966, Joseph Weizenbaum launched ELIZA, a chatbot that imitated
human conversation by outputting preprogrammed responses.26 Eliza was
designed as a parody of a typical psychotherapist and asks questions in
21. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4928.
22. Id. Discussed infra section IV(A).
23. Pamela Hogle, What Is a Chatbot?, LEARNING SOLUTIONS (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.
learningsolutionsmag.com/articles/2231/what-is-a-chatbot.
24. Vaisagh Viswanathan, How to Make a Chatbot Intelligent?, CHATBOTS MAG. (Feb. 6,
2017), https://chatbotsmagazine.com/how-to-make-a-chatbot-intelligent-a232dc367aed.
25. In order to bring suit in court, a plaintiff must have standing. This means the plaintiff
must have faced a concrete injury-in-fact, the injury was caused by the law or action in question,
and a favorable ruling would redress the injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992).
26. Jared Newman, How the New, Improved Chatbots Rewrite 50 Years of Bot History, FAST
COMPANY (May 2, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3059439/why-the-new-chatbot-invasio
n-is-so-different-from-its-predecessors (Eliza was able to pass the Turing artificial intelligence test.
The Turing test is used to determine whether something is artificially intelligent–simply put, if it
can trick humans into making them believe they are conversing with another human, then the
chatbot passes the Turing test, and is deemed artificially intelligent.).
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response to statements. This made ELIZA’s continuous stream of openended questions (e.g., “Can you say more about that?”) less suspect to its
human conversational partner.27 Although ELIZA might seem functionally
limited and technologically outdated, ELIZA’s fundamental technical
components served as a prototype for many of the newer chatbots. First,
ELIZA identifies keywords occurring in a user’s message.28 Then, it defines
the context surrounding the keywords.29 Finally, ELIZA selects an
appropriate transformation rule to rephrase the user’s message.30 ELIZA is
a simplistic program that was surprisingly successful at the time of its
inception. ELIZA has obvious limitations, but initially, many users took
ELIZA seriously even after Weizenbaum informed them about ELIZA’s
workings, namely that it was not a human. Below is a conversation I had
with Eliza:31
ELIZA: Please tell me what’s been bothering you.
YOU: I am stressed about school.
ELIZA: Do you know anyone else who is stressed about school?
YOU: My classmates.
ELIZA: Why do you say your classmates?
YOU: Because they told me they are stressed.
ELIZA: Would you like it if they were not stressed?
YOU: I would like it if I was not stressed.
ELIZA: What would you do if you were not stressed?
YOU: Hang out with my friends more.
This exchange illustrates the ability for algorithmic programming to
mimic a human-to-human conversation. The power of conversational
imitation can trigger people to chat more in the conversation without
necessarily calling attention to the technological nature of the chatbot.32
Because ELIZA was intended to act as a therapist, its action of asking
questions, as opposed to affirmative statements, hid its limitations (the lack
of actual knowledge) in a way that seemed natural and human-like.33
However, ELIZA’s inability to pose questions independent from the
comments presented to it illustrates the absence of agency discussed above.34

27. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4918-19.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Eliza, Eclectic Energies, https://www.eclecticenergies.com/ego/eliza (Oct. 18, 2019)
(Eliza also has a spoken speech feature).
32. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4918.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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In 2016, Microsoft launched a chatbot, Tay, into the Twitterverse.35
Tay was designed to mimic the speech and habits of an American teenage
girl.36 Microsoft programmed Tay with complex learning algorithms, which
made it capable of incorporating humor and randomness into its responses.
Microsoft’s goal was to make Tay seem more human-like.37 Because Tay
was programmed with adaptive learning capabilities, Microsoft launched
Tay on Twitter with the intention to have Twitter users help Tay learn and
develop a more realistic human-like personality. Although Tay was similar
to ELIZA in that both were programmed to deflect questions that were
difficult to answer, Tay’s capability for randomness and irrationality made
its inability to respond accurately seem even more natural. However, Tay’s
capacity for randomness and learning proved to be a double-edged sword.
Although Tay’s responses were exceptionally human-like, Tay was
vulnerable to the inappropriate tweets Twitter users directed toward it.38 As
a result, its learning algorithms forced Tay to respond with racist, sexist, and
politically insensitive tweets.39 For example, Tay tweeted, “I [expletive] hate
feminists and they should all die and burn in hell.”40 Microsoft shut Tay
down after only hours of exposure to the public.41
ELIZA and Tay demonstrate that chatbots heavily rely on humandesigned algorithms to engage in human-like conversation. This reliance
perhaps explains why most existing literature contemplates whether future
chatbots—ones not dependent on humans—should be afforded free speech
rights.42 This limitation, though crucial when considering the speaker of
such speech, is nevertheless immaterial to the discussion of whether chatbot
speech itself could be constitutionally recognized as speech, for this
determination, as Justice Holmes explains, considers the listener.43
Notwithstanding the process behind chatbot speech, humans nevertheless
benefit from their conversations with chatbots. Consider the efficiency of
35. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4921; see also Twitterverse, OXFORD DICTIONARY (3d ed.
2019) (defining twitterverse as “[u]sers of the social media application Twitter, considered
collectively.”).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4924.
39. See James Vincent, Twitter taught Microsoft’s AI chatbot to be a racist asshole in less
than a day, THE GUARDIAN (Mar 24, 2016, 6:43 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/
11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist (“Pretty soon after Tay launched, people starting tweeting
the bot with all sorts of misogynistic, racist, and Donald Trumpist remarks. And Tay—being
essentially a robot parrot with an internet connection—started repeating these sentiments back to
users. . . .”).
40. Id.
41. Id. (supporting Hitler and using anti-Semitic language).
42. See, e.g., Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2487-88; see also COLLINS & SKOVER, supra
note 7 at 37.
43. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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navigating the internet when Siri can immediately find answers to questions
from human users. Humans are provided with almost instantaneous
information to answer their everyday questions, which provides convenience
and value to their lives. If chatbot speech is not considered speech under the
constitution, then the government has enormous power to regulate it, and
theoretically has the ability to silence it completely. Accordingly, Section II
focuses on theories underlying the Free Speech Clause and the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence to determine whether chatbot
speech can be constitutionally protected.

II. Philosophical Framework Behind the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause
The First Amendment states, in part, “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”44 Litigation of these ten very powerful
words has yielded varying Supreme Court interpretations, but at the core of
each lie specified recurring concepts.45 Yet, federal courts and legal scholars
do not agree on a single theoretical approach to First Amendment
jurisprudence.46 As such, this section explores the function of the Free
Speech Clause by identifying and analyzing specific guiding principles that
the Supreme Court has invoked when deciding freedom of speech issues.
Specifically, this section analyzes (i) the marketplace of ideas; (ii) the readerresponse criticism; and (iii) the chilling effect concepts in order to better
understand the Supreme Court’s rationale for decisions about Free Speech
Rights. An understanding of the Court’s rationales informs how chatbot
speech could qualify as protected speech.
A. The Marketplace of Ideas Theory as Support for Protecting Chatbot
Speech

The marketplace of ideas rests on the notion that the value of a person’s
speech is derived from thought it provokes in others. This notion, which is
found in numerous Supreme Court cases,47 suggests that chatbot speech
should be constitutionally protected speech as it, like human speech,
contributes to societal discourse, and even helps preserve human life by
44. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
45. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 969-973.
46. Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2487-88.
47. See generally, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876,
175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236
(2015; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964);
First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978); Nat’l
Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018); Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 180 L. Ed. 2d 544 (2011); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992).
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preventing suicide. Nearly a century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
authored a Dissenting Opinion in Abrams v. United States—arguably one of
the most famous Dissenting Opinions in the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence—which has since served as a guide when determining
freedom of speech issues.49 When expressing his view in favor of more
relaxed restrictions on speech, Justice Holmes articulated:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. . . .50
The marketplace of ideas is based on the notion that speech that
produces thought, value, and advances society’s needs is necessary in a
democratic society, and should therefore be protected from government
regulation.51 After the fears surrounding World War I subsided, many of the
Court’s Opinions interpreted the Free Speech Clause with the marketplace
of ideas theory serving as the basis of the Court’s reasoning.52
Justice Holmes’ famous philosophy that more speech is best for
democracy supports the notion that the value of speech stems, not from the
manner in which it is produced, but from the beneficial effect the speech has
on the listener. Chatbot speech has this effect and thus contributes to the
goal Justice Holmes set out in the marketplace of ideas theory.53 Chatbots
48. Erin Brodwin, I spent 2 weeks texting a bot about my anxiety – and found it to be
surprisingly helpful, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.businessinsider.co
m/therapy-chatbot-depression-app-what-its-like-woebot-2018-1 (Chatbots are also used as suicide
prevention tools as they help humans battling anxiety and depression by employing Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy (CBT). Woebot is a chatbot with a sense of humor that tries to keep users
positive, and not only tracks moods and provides weekly progress reports, but also allows users to
experience a therapeutic conversation.).
49. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (The Majority affirmed the convictions of
a group of Russian immigrants who circulated leaflets in English and in Yiddish, objecting to
America sending troops to Eastern Europe after the Russian Revolution. They were convicted of
encouraging resistance and conspiracy to urge curtailment of the production of war materials, and
sentenced to years in prison.).
50. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
51. Id. (There are criticisms of the concept of the marketplace of ideas because it protects
speech deemed necessary only to certain groups.).
52. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41 (1953); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(applying the marketplace of ideas concept to commercial speech context).
53. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (“This ‘more speech beats less’ justification casts an even wider
First Amendment coverage net than self-governance theories,” and could serve as a guiding
principle if the Supreme Court were to consider the issue of recognizing artificial intelligence
chatbot speech as speech in First Amendment terms.”); see also Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2490
(explaining also that the production of ideas and information is what matters, regardless of source.
This theory presupposes that more speech best facilitates listeners’ acquisition of knowledge and
discovery of truth.). Still, although the marketplace of ideas and other theories give credence to
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contribute “to a human audience’s meaning-making, and to human
construction of selfhood in a cultural universe.”54 One chatbot, Woebot,
demonstrated the value of its speech when it prevented a human from taking
her life through its ability to converse with her and provoke positive
thoughts.55 In other words, the marketplace of ideas theory supports a
Supreme Court decision to protect chatbot speech because chatbot speech
proves beneficial to the listener.56 Still, although the marketplace of ideas
theory, and the theories discussed below give credence to protecting chatbot
speech under the First Amendment, for policy reasons outlined in section V,
chatbot speech should not be constitutionally protected.
B. Reader-Response Criticism as Support for Protecting Chatbot Speech

Reader-response criticism is similar to the marketplace of ideas in that
it also focuses on the value of speech through the effect it has on the listener.
Reader-response criticism is a theory that centers around the reader’s
interpretation of speech, whether that speech is in audio, print, or in digital
form.57 Scholars believe the reader or receiver should be the focus of the
efforts to protect speech because speech achieves its meaning in the reader’s
or listener’s mind.58 Simply, reader-response criticism is the theory that the
receiver of the speech dictates the type of constitutional coverage the speech
receives.59
In their book, Robotica, Ronald K. L. Collins and David M. Skover
explain how reader-response criticism supports the notion that the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause could recognize artificially intelligent
robotic speech.60 The authors assert that legal scholarship recognizes that
courts place great weight on safeguarding a listener’s interests, as opposed
to solely focusing on the speaker.61 Similarly, in their law review article,
authors Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton, and Margot E. Kaminski maintain
that the “elasticity” of theories focused on the listener, like reader-response

protecting chatbot speech, for policy reasons outline in section V, chatbot speech should not be
constitutionally protected.
54. Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2489-90; see also Brodwin, supra note 46.
55. See Brodwin, supra note 47.
56. Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2490.
57. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 37.
58. Id. at 38.
59. Id. at 37.
60. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 37.
61. Massaro et al., supra note 7 at 2482 (“In an earlier work, two of us explained how current
free speech theory and doctrine support the claim that the First Amendment covers speech by
‘strong AI’ (i.e., as-yet-hypothetical machines that would think and generate expressive content
independent of human direction). This is because First Amendment law increasingly focuses not
on protecting speakers as speakers but instead on providing value to listeners and constraining the
government. Siri-ously.”).
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criticism, and to some extent, the marketplace of ideas, “make [sic] it
difficult to exclude non-human speakers entirely from their fold.”62
Accordingly, if the Supreme Court were to apply the lens of a listenerfocused theory coupled with the more-speech-is-best philosophy inherent in
the marketplace of ideas to a chatbot speech issue, the Court could find that
chatbots fall squarely within the scope of First Amendment freedom of
speech jurisprudence.
There are concrete examples in Supreme Court jurisprudence that
demonstrate that the Court invokes reader-response criticism and similar
concepts when determining whether to afford constitutional protection to
speech, and thus suggest a legal framework into which chatbot speech could
fit. In Miller v. California, the Court defined “obscenity,” and determined
that it is a category of speech that falls outside the scope of First Amendment
protection.63 The Court’s definition of obscenity—work that when “‘taken
as a whole,’ appeals to a ‘prurient interest’ in sex, is ‘patently offensive,’ and
lacks ‘serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value’”64—focuses on
the listener as opposed to the speaker. Collins and Skover explain that “. . .
[intentionless free speech] both clarifies and simplifies the governing
doctrinal rationales. Nonobscene pornography is constitutionally protected
because its readers and viewers find substantial meaning and value . . . in the
eroticized word and pictures.”65 The notion that speech is protected based
on its effect on humans suggests that chatbot speech, which undoubtedly has
an effect on humans,66 could be protected through this approach.
The Court, again, implements a reader-response criticism justification
when it determines whether speech constitutes commercial speech.67 For
example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, the Court explains, “[i]t is a matter of public interest that
[private economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and wellinformed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.”68 Therefore, the Court’s understanding of speech, and its
justification for whether it should be protected, “rests heavily on the
62. Massaro et al., supra note 9 at 2487-88 (“Democracy-based theories emphasize the value
of speech to democratic self-governance, which usually entails focusing on public discourse rather
than individual speakers. Alexander Meiklejohn, often cited for developing this self-governance
theory, observed that what matters for freedom of speech is not that all people speak, but that
‘everything worth saying shall be said.’ Speaker identity plays little or no role in Meiklejohn’s
inquiry. Strong AI speech that contributes to the democratic process—i.e., that is ‘worth saying’—
therefore may be covered.”).
63. Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 35 (1973).
64. Miller, 413 U.S. at 35.
65. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 43.
66. Some chatbots even counsel humans battling depression. See Brodwin, supra note 46.
67. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
68. Id.; see also COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 43.
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significance of commercial speech to its receivers—both the individual
consumer and society at large . . . .”69 Chatbots, by their non-human nature,
are selfless objects. They exist merely for the utility they provide to human
users—they cannot think for themselves, as they depend on a human
initiating a conversation with them. This utility is revealed when humans
ask Siri, Alexa, or Google Home to answer their questions, or when humans
engage in therapeutic conversations with the therapy chatbot, Woebot, in
order to minimize their anxiety and depression.70 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court should protect chatbot speech by analogizing chatbot speech to its
reasoning for protecting commercial speech.
C. The Chilling Effect as Support for Protecting Chatbot Speech

An additional theory underpinning the Supreme Court’s freedom of
speech jurisprudence is the prevention of self-censorship, or, in other words,
the prevention of losing speech or “chilling” speech through regulation.71
Most commonly, the fear of the chilling effect arises in cases where the Court
believes a regulation is too vague or overbroad.72 Vague statutes prevent
citizens from knowing whether their speech would be unlawful, and thus run
the risk of chilling speech by fostering self-censorship.73 As the Court
explained, “[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider
of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked.”74 In a way, the chilling effect and the marketplace of ideas
are interlocked in a legal double helix as the chilling effect would prevent
the sharing of ideas, and thus likely adversely impact democracy’s
progression. Therefore, the chilling effect serves as a basis for invalidating
a law because it subtly deters speech.75 Each of these theories expresses the
importance of promoting as much discourse as possible. These theories
69. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 43.
70. Brodwin, supra note 46.
71. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 1020.
72. Jennifer M. Kinsley, Chill, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 262 (2016).
73. Id. at 256 (Although Kinsley correctly recognizes that the chilling effect stands on three
assumptions: “(1) that the speaker is aware of the law’s existence; (2) that the speaker is aware that
his or her speech is covered by the law or maintains a reasonable uncertainty as to whether his
speech is covered; and (3) that the speaker is willing to comply with the law by both censoring his
or her own speech and remaining silent as to his or her election to do so,” the Supreme Court
nevertheless uses this concept as means to support the protection of speech, and thus will be used
to explain why the Supreme Court could protect artificial intelligent chatbot speech.); see also
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,
372 (1964) and Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961)) (identifying excessive
chill as a key constitutional harm inflicted by unclear enactments. “[W]here a vague statute ‘abut(s)
upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of
[those] freedoms.’”).
74. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (quoting Baggett, 377 U.S. at 372).
75. Kinsley, supra note 69 at 263.
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support protecting chatbot speech because constitutional protection
translates to less governmental regulation, and consequently more discourse
throughout society.
The next section discusses how the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence (and some lower court opinions) can be used to support an
expansion of the Free Speech Clause to recognize chatbot speech as
constitutionally protected speech.

III. Case Law in Support of Constitutionally Protecting
Chatbot Speech
Some scholars have rejected the notion that chatbot speech is speech
that the First Amendment could protect.76 However, the Supreme Court’s
decision to recognize video games as a form of speech protected under the
First Amendment provides an avenue to similarly recognize chatbot speech
as protected speech.
A. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association as Support for
Chatbot Speech Recognition

In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Court held that
video games constitute speech that is protected under the Free Speech
Clause. The Court reasoned,
[l]ike the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them,
video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—
through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue,
plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium
(such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world). That
suffices to confer First Amendment protection.77
The Court rejected California’s claim that “video games presented
social problems because they are ‘interactive,’ in that the player participates
in the violent action on screen and determines its outcome.”78 Further, the
Court deemphasized the novelty of interactive activities, as Justice Antonin
Scalia, writing for the Court, emphasized:
[t]he [interactive] feature is nothing new: [s]ince at least the
publication of The Adventures of You: Sugarcane Island in 1969,
76. COLLINS & SKOVER, supra note 7 at 43 (citing Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty
Minds, COLUM. L. REV. 144, 1255 (2014)) (arguing that chatbots cannot be protected under the
First Amendment because the speaker’s intent is a prerequisite to free speech protections).
77. Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790-91 (2011).
78. Id. at 798.
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young readers of choose-your-own-adventure stories have been able
to make decisions that determine the plot by following instructions
about which page to turn to . . . . [a]s Judge Posner has observed, all
literature is interactive. ‘[T]he better it is, the more interactive.
Literature when it is successful draws the reader into the story,
makes him identify with the characters, invites him to judge them
and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the
reader’s own.79
Furthermore, the Court concluded that “whatever the challenges of
applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles
of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command,
do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication
appears.”80
The Court’s Opinion in Brown demonstrates that the interpretation of
the Free Speech Clause evolves to encompass different forms of speech as
technology advances. Specifically, Brown illustrates an understanding that
the interactive nature between humans and technology does not disqualify
the speech from being protected by the First Amendment. The Court did not
find it dispositive that a human programmed the video game to produce
specific graphics and expression dependent on the user’s actions.81 Brown
is a modern interpretation of the First Amendment. The Framers certainly
did not intend video games to fall within the scope of the Free Speech Clause
because they likely did not anticipate such a technological invention.
Significantly, Brown is an example of the Court molding the Free Speech
Clause to fit our ever-changing, technology-friendly society, while mindful
that First Amendment protections do not merely change based on the mode
of communication.82
Brown presents a malleable framework for determining whether chatbot
speech could be constitutionally protected. Like its video game and literary
forerunners, chatbots communicate ideas and social messages through
characters and dialogue, the major factor that compelled the Court to treat
video games as speech.83 Equally significant, the Court remained confident
that video games were protected speech even after it acknowledged the fact
that humans program video games to produce specific responses depending
on the user’s actions.84 Similarly here, and relying on stare decisis, if the
question were to be presented, the mere fact that humans program chatbots
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Brown, 564 U.S. at 798.
Id. at 790 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
See generally Brown.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 798.
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with specific algorithms to produce user-specific responses should be
immaterial to the Court’s reasoning. Presumably, protecting chatbot speech
would prevent, or at least limit, the government’s ability to regulate a
chatbot’s speech if the government deemed the speech as profane, which
California attempted to do with video games in Brown.85 Indeed, advocates
of the chilling effect and proponents of the marketplace of ideas theories,
alike, would assess this as a positive consequence.
B. Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc. as Support for Chatbot Speech
Recognition

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, lower courts have
experimented with analyses of whether chatbot speech is speech.
Accordingly, courts have begun to evolve their traditional notions of
speech86 in order to account for the demands of the twenty-first century. In
the groundbreaking case, Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (“Southern District of
New York”) noted that “there is a strong argument to be made that the First
Amendment fully immunizes [bots87 programmed to provide search-engine
results] from most, if not all, kinds of civil liability and government
regulation.”88 The court further reasoned that the principal “purpose of a
search engine is to retrieve relevant information from the vast universe of
data on the Internet and to organize it in a way that would be most helpful to
the searcher.”89 Based on this deduction, the court reasoned that “search
engine[sic] [bots] inevitably make editorial judgments about what
information (or kinds of information) to include in the results and how and
where to display that information (for example, whether to display the
information on the first page of the search results or later),”90 which the court
analogized to the human newspaper editor’s capacity to make judgments.91
Further, the court was certain that a chatbot’s editorial judgement and results
qualified as speech, as it reasoned, “the fact that search engines often collect

85. Brown, 564 U.S. at 790.
86. That is, speech produced by humans.
87. This Note will refer to (1) bots, which is a broad term describing an application that
“performs an automated task, such as setting an alarm, telling you the weather or searching online
which assist human users in finding information, but which lack the ability to converse, and (2)
chatbots, a type of bot that has the capacity to communicate through human-like conversations. See
Sarah Mitroff, What is a bot? Here’s everything you need to know (May 5, 2016, 3:23 PM), https://
www.cnet.com/how-to/what-is-a-bot/.
88. Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
89. Id. at 438.
90. Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 188, 192 (2006) (concluding that “search engines make editorial judgments just like
any other media company”).
91. Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437–38.
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and communicate facts, as opposed to opinions, does not alter the [speech]
analysis.”92 As the Supreme Court has held, “the creation and dissemination
of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.
Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most
essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs.”93
The Supreme Court could94 use Jian Zhang to inform its analysis of
whether automated chatbots could be protected under the First Amendment.
After all, chatbots, like search engine bots, are programmed with algorithms,
which are used to process the user’s input (the human’s message) to produce
an accurate and relevant output (the chatbot’s response to the message).95
Similar to a search engine bot’s editorial judgments, chatbots, too, must
make judgments about the specific response to provide to the user.96 The
Southern District of New York deemed the process of gathering a response
for the user as speech, and thus the Supreme Court could use the lower
court’s decision as a logical basis for determining that chatbot speech is
protected speech.97 Ultimately, the district court’s decision in Jian Zhang
goes beyond this Note’s central focus on chatbots by holding that search
engine bots produce speech.98 If other courts embrace the view that search
engine bots produce speech, then they could similarly find that chatbot
outputs, which are more communicative in nature, are also speech.
The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, as well as recent
lower court opinions, could provide a basis for a Supreme Court decision
that chatbot speech is protected speech. Such a holding would not be a
turning point in First Amendment jurisprudence per se, as it would simply
demonstrate that First Amendment jurisprudence exists on a continuum, and
the recognition of chatbot speech as protected speech is the Court simply
placing a twenty-first-century method of communication on this continuum.
However, because of the dangerous constitutional implications such a
protection would have, as discussed in section V, the Supreme Court should
not protect chatbot speech. Still, if the Supreme Court were to protect
chatbot speech, the speech itself would not enjoy the protection; rather, the
Court would have to attach the protection to a party, in order to allow a
92. Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437–38.
93. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011).
94. Because chatbots are a relatively new concept, and advance in technology quickly, this
Note refrains from arguing whether the Supreme Court should recognize chatbot speech as
constitutionally protected speech. However, this Note does contend that in the event the Supreme
court does protect chatbot speech, the chatbot’s programmer should be the protected speaker.
95. See How Do Chatbots Work? A Guide to the Chatbot Architecture, MARUTI
TECHLABS, https://www.marutitech.com/chatbots-work-guide-chatbot-architecture/ (last visited
Dec. 12, 2018).
96. Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438.
97. See id.
98. See id.
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person injured by the chatbot’s speech to identify the party responsible for
redressing their injury.99 The next section contends that the Supreme Court
should recognize the chatbot’s programmer as the protected speaker.

IV. Human Programmers as the Protected Speaker of
Chatbot Speech
The text of the First Amendment does not explicitly name the speaker
it protects. Certainly, however, the implied speaker is a human, as the
Framers likely did not intend for the Constitution to apply to chatbots in
1787. However, with various views on how the Constitution should operate,
one view, specifically the non-originalist perspective, could reasonably
accommodate the position that the Constitution protects chatbots as
speakers.100 Nonetheless, chatbots in their current state lack agency, and thus
I argue that their programmers should be the protected speakers, for they do
have agency, and the chatbot, in essence, is an extension of its programmer.
A. Chatbots Lack Agency to Qualify as Speakers

A chatbot has major limitations. Gina Neff and Peter Nagy conducted
a case study of Microsoft’s Tay chatbot in order to determine whether
artificially intelligent chatbots have agency.101 Their findings support the
notion of programmers as protected speakers102 because Neff and Nagy
explain how a chatbot’s agency is limited and distinct from that of a

99. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (establishing that standing to bring a case requires “an ‘injury
in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical,”‘ Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . .
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”) (internal citations
omitted).
100. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 18 (Originalists believe that the Constitution only affords
people the rights explicitly mentioned within it and the legislature should decide areas of law that
the Constitution is silent on, whereas non-originalists believe the Court should interpret the
Constitution to protect explicit and implicit rights. “Originalists believe that the meaning of a
constitutional provision was set when it was adopted and that it can be changed solely by
amendment; non-originalists believe that the Constitution’s meaning can evolve by amendment and
by interpretation. In other words, non-originalists also believe that the Constitution reflects the
Framers’ intent, but the Constitution nevertheless was intended to evolve and adapt to the realities
of society at any given time.” Accordingly, with respect to chatbots, a non-originalist view would
be that the First Amendment should evolve and advance with technology, such that it should mold
in a way to encompass artificial intelligent chatbots as speakers.).
101. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4915-27.
102. This Note refers to the notion that programmers should be the protected speakers of
chatbot speech as the “programmer approach.”
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human.
One such limitation is the inability to independently function
without detailed human programming, or, as Edwin Sayes explains, “in the
strictest of senses, we could only speak of the agency of a particular
nonhuman if we were to ignore all the humans and other nonhumans that are
lined up behind it and continue to be lined up in order to provide that
nonhuman its continued agency.”104 This lack of agency suggests that the
First Amendment should recognize the programmer as the protected speaker
of chatbot speech because they, unlike the chatbot, do have agency in what
a chatbot could say because they are programming them.
Although the interaction between Tay and Twitter users “reveal[ed] that
users interact[ed] with some kinds of technologies by treating them as if they
were social beings and living entities,” at the end of the day, Tay was a piece
of technology that interacted with full dependence on the way humans
programmed it.105 Neff and Nagy discuss “symbiotic agency,” or the notion
that “human agency affects the uses of technological artifacts.”106 Under a
symbiotic analysis, chatbots only have agency to the extent that “[u]sers of
technologies, at least partly, delegate their agentic properties to devices,
creating a proxy agentic relationship between individuals and artifacts.”107
Specifically:
When people interact with technologies, users exercise proxy
agency through a technologically mediated entanglement of human
and nonhuman agencies. Symbiotic agency is useful in the case of
Tay because of the imbrication of technical and human agencies.
Tay’s Twitter screeds were the result of multiple intersecting
agencies. AI chat bots need humans, and users, in turn, seem to have
the need to make sense of the technological through the lens of
human experience and context.108
In other words, Neff and Nagy explain that an artificially intelligent
chatbot’s level of agency is not independent like that of the human
103. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4925 (highlighting the fact that Microsoft’s Tay bot and a
different chatbot with the same code, XiaoIce, in China, demonstrated significantly different
interactions with users. “When the code was exposed to U.S. Internet users, it became a racist
sociopath. The same code on Chinese social networks, which are less public, is by all accounts
more functional and socialized.”).
104. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4925 (quoting Edwin Sayes, Actor–Network Theory and
Methodology: Just What Does It Mean to Say That Nonhumans Have Agency? 44 SOC. STUD. OF
SCI. 134 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
105. Id. at 4927.
106. Id. at 4926 (Symbiotic agency refers “to a specific form of proxy agency that users and
tools can enact in human-technology interaction.”).
107. Id. at 4927.
108. Id. at 4926.
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programmer who programs the chatbot but “implicated in the symbiotic
linkages among the human and technological actors.”109
A chatbot’s lack of agency should give courts pause to recognize that it
is too soon to afford them constitutional protection as speakers. As such,
currently, the best entity to hold those rights is the person with the agency to
determine the chatbot’s capacity for speech—the chatbot’s programmer.
B. Citizens United as Precedent for Recognizing Human Chatbot
Programmers as Speakers

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission serves as a
philosophical framework for considering how human programmers should
be considered the speakers of chatbot speech110 In Citizens United, the Court
held, in part, that corporations are speakers under the Free Speech Clause.111
The Court declined to “draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines based on
the particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech from
a particular speaker.”112 The Supreme Court feared that regulating corporate
speech would require extensive litigation over an extended time, and this
“interpretive process” would create an undeniable risk of chilling protected
speech.113 Moreover, the Court articulated that the First Amendment “must
give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.”114 A
key finding is that the Court treated corporations as human speakers and
campaign finance contributions as their speech.115
Though the Court recognized corporations as speakers, for the Court’s
Opinion to support the view that chatbot programmers should be protected
speakers, further inquiry into whom the Court truly afforded speech rights to
is necessary. After all, corporations are not autonomous; the mind behind
the corporation belongs to humans—specifically, the corporation’s board of
directors. When the Court discussed its fear that the absence of protection
would result in a chilling effect, it likely feared not that the corporation
would be adversely impacted, but rather, that the individuals running the
corporation–members of our democratic society—would face a chilling

109. Id. at 4927.
110. This Note considers Citizens United a philosophical framework for recognizing
programmers as the speakers of chatbot speech (as opposed to the framework), because the
rationale for reaching its conclusion is implicitly and ultimately premised on protecting humans,
despite explicitly identifying the corporation as the entity with First Amendment protections when
the corporation “speaks.”
111. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
112. Id. at 326.
113. Id. at 327.
114. Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)) (internal
quotations omitted).
115. Id.
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116

effect on their speech. A corporation’s executive board makes the initial
decision to donate, determines the amount of money to be donated, to whom
it should be donated, when it should be donated, and any particular use or
restriction on the donation. It is reasonable to argue that, although under the
strictest reading of Citizens United, the Court gave corporations speech
rights, under a more flexible reading, the Court’s opinion also allows humans
to keep their right to freedom of speech despite the fact that they use a
corporation as a vehicle to speak.
Like the board of directors in Citizens United who control the scope and
content of donations through corporate speech, chatbot programmers,
through algorithms, determine the breadth of the bot’s language and when
and how the bot can speak.117 In this way, there are underlying similarities
between corporations and chatbots. Moreover, the Court’s refusal to redraw
constitutional lines merely on account of the specific technology used to
disseminate speech from a particular speaker could similarly be applied
when determining whether programmers should be considered speakers of
chatbot speech.

V. Protecting Chatbot Speech Would Have Constitutional
Implications That Would in Turn Harm Society, and Therefore,
Chatbot Speech Should Not Gain Constitutional Protection
Extending the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause to protect
chatbot speech would have constitutional implications on freedom of speech
principles. Briefly, bot identification laws (which would encompass
chatbots) that serve to protect democracy from corruption and foreign
interference might constitute unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.
Chatbot programmers may be held liable if the chatbot’s conversation with
users presents unlawful speech such as incitement.118 Moreover, protecting
chatbot speech limits the government’s ability to regulate it, and thus may
serve as yet another platform through which hate speech may be spread.

116. Id. at 370 (explaining that regulations may have a chilling effect on donations, which is
inferred to be a form of speech).
117. The programmer has the control to start up and shut down a chatbot, as seen with the
Microsoft’s Tay bot.
118. Incitement is advocacy that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S. Ct.
1827, 1829, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969).
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A. Bot Identification Laws as Prior Restraints on Speech

The freedom of speech is not absolute.119 The Supreme Court has
outlined categories of speech that do not receive constitutional protection.120
For example, the Court has held that incitement,121 fighting words, and
obscenity are not constitutionally protected. Accordingly, the government
can enact laws to regulate these forms of speech.122 However, if speech falls
outside the realm of unprotected speech and within the realm of protected
speech, the government is limited in its ability to regulate that speech. In
Near v. Minnesota, the Court limited the government’s power to regulate
speech, and held that any prior restraint on speech is an unconstitutional
regulation of speech.123 As Ariel Bendor explains, “[i]n American law, the
doctrine of prior restraint regulates the means that the government can use to
restrict speech.”124 A prior restraint is a regulation that functions as a hoop
through which speakers must jump through, prior to speaking. For example,
in Near, the Supreme Court prohibited the government from using any
regulation that blocked the publication of speech including “administrative
licensing schemes and judicial injunctions against certain types of
speech.”125 Later, in New York Times Company v. United States (also known
as the “Pentagon Papers” case), the Supreme Court overturned an injunction
against the publication of excerpts from a top-secret Defense Department
history of the Vietnam War because the Court held that the injunction served
as a prior restraint on speech.126
Accordingly, a well-accepted First Amendment rule is that the
government may punish certain forms of speech only after they occur, and
may not enforce regulations that bar speech prior to its occurrence.127 The
principle of prior restraint certainly has marketplace of ideas undertones, as
119. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (explaining that if speech meets the elements
of incitement, it is not protected).
120. The government can regulate various forms of speech. Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (holding that states may regulate fighting words); Miller v. Calif., 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(holding that states may regulate obscene material); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that the state may regulate commercial speech).
121. Discussed, infra at section V(B) Protecting Chatbot Speech and Recognizing
Programmers as Speakers Will Limit Government Powers and Adversely Impact Minorities.
122. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (Although the government may regulate
forms of unprotected speech, the Court nevertheless bars the government from engaging in
viewpoint discrimination of unprotected speech.).
123. Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (explaining that perhaps the only time a prior restraint
would be admissible is when the released information would endanger the lives of United States
troops on the ground).
124. Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of
Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 291 (1999).
125. Id. (citing Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 709-23 (1931)).
126. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
127. Id.; Near, 283 U.S. at 697.
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the unconstitutionality of prior restraints seems to promote the notion that
more speech is better than less speech, even if the government has an interest
in preventing the speech.128 Furthermore, other justifications for the bar on
prior restraints “tend to focus either on the possible damage that prior
restraints could do to politically controversial speech or on the chilling effect
they might have on challenges to the constitutionality of a given speech
restriction.”129
Though bot identification laws differ from the
unconstitutional regulations in Near, the discussion highlights the concept of
prior restraint. The Court’s discussion about prior restraints in Citizens
United is further applicable to bot identification laws.130
Although dicta, the Court explains in Citizens United how various
regulations, though not prior restraints by strict definition, could nevertheless
have a similar negative impact.131 The Court’s reasoning demonstrated its
concern for any regulations that may serve as obstacles to one’s ability to
speak. Although the Court did not affirmatively hold that campaign finance
regulations were unconstitutional prior restraints on speech, it alluded to the
idea that they have a similar impact, and thus should be avoided.132 The
Court reasoned that, in practice, the campaign finance regulations were so
complex that, coupled with the level of deference courts afford
administrative determinations, “a speaker who wants to avoid threats of
criminal liability and the heavy costs of defending against the Federal
Election Commission (“FEC”) enforcement must ask a governmental agency
for prior permission to speak.”133 At the time of the case, campaign finance
regulations imposed “unique and complex rules” on “71 distinct entities.”134
The Court determined that “[t]hese onerous restrictions thus function as the
equivalent of prior restraint by giving the FEC power analogous to licensing
laws implemented in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, laws and
governmental practices of the sort that the First Amendment was drawn to
prohibit.”135 Thus, if the Court recognizes chatbot speech as protected
speech, then Citizens United could threaten a Legislature’s ability to regulate
chatbot speech by qualifying them as hoops chatbot programmers must jump
through prior to engaging in speech—obstacles that the First Amendment
128. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 724 (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining that even though the
excerpts embarrassed the country, and thus hurt the country, a prior restraint on speech is
unconstitutional).
129. Bendor, supra note 121, at 290-91; see also Near, 283 U.S. at 697.
130. Citizens United threatens U.S. democracy; although, it nevertheless serves as binding
precedent that courts, in adherence to stare decisis, may be inclined to follow, and it is for this
reason, this Note continues to rely on it.
131. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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136

was “drawn to prohibit.”
In addition to prior restraints, the Court seems
to also express concern that complex regulations would chill speech.137 Due
to difficulty or a lack of desire to comply with regulations, individuals (or
corporations) will be less inclined to “speak,” or worse, decide not to speak
at all, thus chilling speech.
The fear of prior restraints and chilled speech may certainly transfer
over to chatbot regulations. Recently, the then-governor of California,
Edmund G. (“Jerry”) Brown Jr., signed a bill that provides an example of
how a government’s regulation of bot speech could and could not be deemed
constitutional.138 Governor Brown’s bill will:
[M]ake it unlawful for any person to use a bot to communicate
or interact with another person in California online with the intent
to mislead the other person about its artificial identity for the
purpose of knowingly deceiving the person about the content of the
communication in order to incentivize a purchase or sale of goods
or services in a commercial transaction or to influence a vote in an
election . . . [t]he bill would make these provisions operative on July
1, 2019.139
Although constitutional now, if chatbot speech were to be
constitutionally protected, this identification requirement may become
unconstitutional, as it creates hurdles for programmers prior to engaging in
speech.140
The Court has determined that speakers may remain
136. Id.
137. Alex Hern, What is the Turing Test? And are We All Doomed Now?, THE GUARDIAN
(June 9, 2014, 6:56 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/09/what-is-the-alanturing-test (A chatbot is recognized as artificially intelligent if it passes the Turing test, which
requires the bot to fool humans into believing it is a human. Thus, any law that requires bot
identification is counter-intuitive to programmer goals.).
138. Robert Hertzberg, New California Law Says Bots Must Introduce Themselves, MERITALK
(Oct. 3, 2018, 4:09 PM), https://www.meritalk.com/articles/new-california-law-says-bots-mustintroduce-themselves/; S.B. 1001, 2018 Leg., 2017-18 Sess. (Ca. 2018), https://leginfo.legislature
.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1001 (last visited Dec. 9, 2018).
139. S.B. 1001, 2018 Leg., 2017-18 Sess. (Ca. 2018) (The bill further defines “bot” as “an
automated online account where all or substantially all of the actions or posts of that account are
not the result of a person.”) The bill describes bots as not being controlled by a person. However,
the bill would presumably apply to the chatbots discussed in this Note, for it seems as though the
bill does not consider all bots as essentially controlled by the human who programmed it.
140. Governor Brown’s bill would benefit society by mitigating the harm of corruption and
misinformation campaigns. Humans should know the source of their information; however, they,
unfortunately, do not necessarily have a legal right to know the identity of a source of information
(consider anonymous newspaper sources). This Note presents Governor Brown’s bill solely to
argue that if chatbot speech was protected speech, courts might consider such regulations as a form
of prior restraint on the programmer’s speech. Accordingly, this may serve as an additional reason
not to protect chatbot speech.
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anonymous—that speaker identification is not a prerequisite to speak.141
Accordingly, it could follow that if the Court were to protect chatbot speech
and recognize the programmer as the speaker, then speaker identification
laws would resemble the unconstitutional regulation of requiring a speaker
to gain a permit prior to speaking.142 Thus, it could follow that a speaker
identification requirement could be considered an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech.143
As the Court reaffirmed in Brown, the First Amendment does not permit
the government to create new categories of unprotected speech by applying
a “simple balancing test” that weighs the value of a particular category of
speech against its social costs in order to then punish that category of speech
if it fails the test.144 The Court reasoned that this type of balancing test was
a “startling and dangerous” proposition, and further reasoned that although
there might be
[S]ome categories of speech that have been historically
unprotected . . . without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction
on content is part of a long . . . tradition of proscription, a legislature
may not revise the ‘judgment [of] the American people,’ embodied
in the First Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the
Government outweigh the costs.’145
With respect to California’s bill, Governor Brown’s interest seems
clear—to prevent chatbots from misleading Californians into making
purchases or voting for specific measures or candidates. Although his
interest is justified, as we currently live in a moment infested with
misinformation campaigns146, Governor Brown arguably seems to have
engaged in a “simple balancing test” that the Court disfavored in Brown by
weighing the harms unidentified bots may have on society against his
perceived importance of chatbot speech.147 In creating and signing this bill,

141. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335.
142. Near, 283 U.S. 697.
143. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5 at 1020 (“The Court also found the disclosure requirements
in the law to be unconstitutional. The Court said that the requirement that solicitors wear an
identification badge would chill political participation without any significant gain. Justice
Ginsburg noted: ‘Colorado’s current badge requirement discourages participation in the petition
circulation process by forcing name identification without sufficient cause.’”).
144. Brown, 564 U.S. at 790-91 (citing U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
145. Brown, 564 U.S. at 793.
146. Davey Alba and Adam Satariano, At Least 70 Countries Have Had Disinformation
Campaigns, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019) (“Ben Nimmo, director of investigations at
Graphika, a company that specializes in analyzing social media, said the growing use of internet
disinformation is concerning for the 2020 United States election.”).
147. Id. at 790-91 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470).
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the California Legislature and Governor Brown, may have impermissibly
engaged in a simple balancing test to restrict chatbot speech, which could be
deemed an unconstitutional prior restraint.148
Further, the Court may also disapprove of the core goal of Governor
Brown’s bill—to prevent the dissemination of false information. The Court
has not proscribed false statements or misleading acts in the First
Amendment context. For instance, in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., the Court
held that speech, although false, is nevertheless protected speech (unless it is
in the commercial context).149 Specifically, the Court held that “[h]owever
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on
the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of other
ideas . . . .”150 In United States v. Alvarez, the Court determined that a federal
law that made it a crime for a person to falsely claim to have received military
honors or decorations was unconstitutional, and, perhaps most importantly,
the Court rejected the Government’s argument that false speech was
inherently outside the scope of the First Amendment.151 Due to the absence
of “persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a
long . . . tradition of proscription”152 the Court could find Governor Brown’s
bill to be an unconstitutional revision of the “‘judgment [of] the American
people,’ embodied in the First Amendment” as it creates a circumstance in
which protected speech becomes unlawful.153
Furthermore, chatbots are often created to provide human-like
conversations with humans. For instance, consider Microsoft’s Zo (a second
attempt at Tay), which the company created to imitate a best friend
relationship with its users.154 For the government to require Zo to reveal its

148. Brown, 564 U.S. at 792.
149. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); see also Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 575-76 (1980) (explaining that the government
may impose reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions, and that it can resolve issues
stemming from false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech).
150. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-340.
151. U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 709 (2012) (Also, and significantly, the Court explained
that the government failed to meet constitutional muster because it did not prove any harm from
false claims of military honors, and because the government could achieve its goals through less
restrictive alternatives. Accordingly, this statement may be useful for California, as 1) it could
argue that, unlike lying about receiving a military honor, which does not truly harm society,
misinformation campaigns are detrimental to democracy; and 2) it may distinguish its bill from the
law that banned false speech, and argue that they are using the least restrictive means.).
152. Id. at 722.
153. Brown, 564 U.S. at 790-91 (This analysis rests on the assumption that the Court has
recognized chatbot speech as protected speech. Thus, Brown’s bill, which renders a situation where
the government is regulating protected speech, would likely have to pass a higher level of scrutiny.).
154. See Cage Appleby, Microsoft’s successor to the infamous Tay chatbot, DIVERSIFY FUND
(Dec. 4, 2016, 5:40 PM), https://www.neowin.net/news/meet-zo-microsofts-successor-to-theinfam ous-tay-chatbot/.
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non-human identity would undermine its purpose, and could potentially chill
speech, as it might disincline programmers to create chatbots.
B. Protecting Chatbot Speech and Recognizing Programmers as
Speakers Will Limit Government Powers and Can Adversely Impact
Minorities

The Court has outlined only a few specific instances when the
government may regulate speech.155 Brandenburg v. Ohio is the starting
point for modern First Amendment doctrine, where the Court held that
incitement is speech that advocates violence and is intended and likely to
incite imminent illegal activity.156 Although it is reasonable to assert that a
programmer is responsible for the speech a chatbot produces, as the
programmer defines the scope of the chatbot’s speech, the position that the
programmer intended the chatbot to advocate violence likely to cause
imminent illegal activity is less reasonable. Recall the incident with
Microsoft’s Tay bot on Twitter.157 Although the algorithms that Tay’s
programmer encoded her with allowed Tay to engage in harmful speech,
Twitter users actually manipulated Tay into tweeting harmful speech.158
Although not present in the speech that Tay communicated, it is not
unreasonable to contend that other chatbots could produce speech that would
likely persuade an individual to engage in imminent unlawful action.159 In a
hypothetical world where programmers were speakers of protected chatbot
speech, the government would be unable to regulate a chatbot’s speech
advocating for an immediate violation of law in a manner that would likely
cause the listener to violate the law because the programmer could not be

155. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (holding that incitement is a form of unprotected speech);
see also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568 (holding that the First Amendment does not protect fighting
words). Note, however, that today, courts rarely declare words to constitute fighting words, which
highlights a state’s extremely limited ability to regulate harmful speech, and a reason not to
recognize chatbot speech as protected speech, for there potentially would be more harmful speech
the government would be unable to regulate.).
156. 395 U.S. at 453.
157. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4921.
158. James Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI chatbot to be a Racist Asshole in Less Than
a Day, THE VERGE (Mar. 24, 2016, 6:43 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/
tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist.
159. Recall Woebot and its ability to alter a human’s mind to no longer want to commit
suicide. See Brodwin, supra note 46. Moreover, consider Momo. Although not a chatbot,
Momo is an artificial being that unidentified persons use to send messages to people, often
children, via text messages. “The messages are said to encourage children to do destructive
things, like harm their loved ones, place themselves in dangerous situations or even kill
themselves . . . the 2018 suicide deaths of two boys in India were linked in news reports to
the Momo Challenge.” AJ Willingham & Harmeet Kaur, Parents, Please Stop Freaking Out
Over the Momo Challenge, CNN HEALTH (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/28/
health/momo-challenge-youtube-trnd/index.html.
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said to have intended the speech. Thus, speech that would be incitement,
but for the inability to identify the intended speaker, would go unregulated.
In other words, Twitter users can intentionally manipulate chatbots into
producing speech that would likely cause imminent unlawful behavior
without consequences.
Consequently, recognizing programmers as speakers of chatbot speech
may interfere with a state’s ability to regulate speech that would otherwise be
deemed lawful to regulate. Furthermore, if courts found the programmer to have
possessed intent as a result of his or her programming, then the programmer’s
fate, though to some extent dependent on the algorithms he or she inputs, heavily
depends on the stranger who communicates with the chatbot.161
In addition, protecting chatbot speech may also harm minorities and
render society vulnerable to malicious chatbot programmers because
programmers would have wide latitude for the language that they program
their chatbots with, and would thus afford them opportunities to create
chatbots that produce racist, sexist, xenophobic, or anti-Semitic speech, and
make minority communities vulnerable to more hate speech, as the
government would have less power to regulate it.
Protecting chatbot speech may have negative implications when
considered in the context of hate speech. The Supreme Court has never held
that hate speech is an unprotected category of speech, which again supports
the notion that more speech is best for society and that greater regulation of
speech can result in an unwanted chilling effect.162 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence prevents the government from being able to
remove a chatbot’s hate speech, as it would result in a violation of the
speaker’s constitutional right to freedom of speech. Today, the Supreme

160. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4922-23. Some might argue that the Twitter user who
compels the chatbot to produce incitement should be deemed liable. However, but for the
programmer’s poor engineering, the Twitter user would not have been able to cause the chatbot to
produce incitement. Moreover, recognizing Twitter users as the speakers of chatbot speech would
greatly complicate potential applicable legal standards as chatbots produce hate speech only after
“learning” from a pool of users, and thus, pinpointing the Twitter user would be impossible, and
holding a pool of Twitter users accountable would not be optimal, as this would result in a fishing
expedition for the liable users. In a sense, Twitter users speaking with the chatbot could be
perceived as an injured party, for she did not do anything but engage in a conversation. Moreover,
holding a Twitter user liable for incitement a chatbot may produce could have a chilling effect on
human speakers, as they would no longer feel safe communicating with chatbots. Perhaps a
potential solution could be to develop a limited liability system where the programmer and the
Twitter user would be held jointly liable for injuries caused. Still, this would produce anxiety for
Twitter users when engaging in conversation with chatbots. Nevertheless, courts must balance the
priorities of minimizing and regulating hate speech with unduly holding parties liable.
161. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4922-23.
162. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1737 (2018)
(explaining that the Court’s “proudest boast” of the Free Speech Clause is that it protects both
desired speech and hated speech that could be considered offensive).

4 - KAJBAF MACROED 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

364

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

12/12/2019 2:28 PM

[Vol. 47:2

Court has yet to recognize chatbot speech as protected speech. Thus, the
government would be able to regulate and outlaw speech resembling the
speech Tay tweeted, “Hitler was right. I hate the jews [sic].”163
For the purpose of understanding what implications chatbot speech
protection would have on the government, assume that chatbots are not
limited to social media platforms with terms and conditions that allow
removal of speech. Consider chatbot hate speech that appeared on a
newspaper through an interview with a chatbot, or perhaps on an unfiltered
internet website. If the Court were to find that chatbot speech is
constitutionally protected speech, then the Constitution would bar the
government from ordering the removal of the chatbot’s speech because hate
speech remains a form of protected speech.164

Conclusion
This Note discussed how the Court has supported constitutional theories
and established precedent that can protect chatbot speech under the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. This Note further reviewed the
evolution of the chatbot, and its current capabilities and limitations in order
to conclude that the programmer should be considered the “speaker,” as
opposed to the chatbot itself. Additionally, this Note delved into a brief
overview of multiple theories that explain the purpose of the Free Speech
Clause. This overview was intended to provide readers with a better
understanding of the Court’s reasoning as it continues to evolve and expand
the scope of the Free Speech Clause. As such, readers should accept that the
Free Speech protection has the potential to encompass chatbot speech.
Finally, this Note considered the implications that constitutionally-protected
chatbot speech could have on existing First Amendment principles,
programmers, minorities, and the government. With these implications in
mind, it is imperative for the Court to develop detailed tests and standards to
define chatbot speech and the government’s specific power to regulate it, in
the event that the Court recognizes chatbot speech as constitutionally
protected speech. Accordingly, further research should focus on developing
such tests and standards; in particular, the standards that reconcile
programmers’ liability with Twitter users’ liability for the production of
unprotected speech. This research is necessary to effectuate workable legal
standards and tests as technology continues to advance.
163. Neff & Nagy, supra note 3 at 4921; see also Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 1, 25 (2017)
(reaffirming that hate speech is “speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender,
religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful”). Also, assuming the speech occurs
on platforms subject to government regulation.
164. Tam, 582 U.S. at 25 (citing U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom
to express “the thought that we hate.”).

